epochal shift. We are now at one of such great historical caesuras. What historians will call the "long twentieth century" ended not with the terrorist attacks of 2001, but with the financial crisis that started in 2007.
A particular historical example holds a powerful analogy to the current transition of economic leadership and political power. Great Britain's economic position took a bad tumble in the financial crisis of 1931, when the pound was taken off the gold standard, but it was only some twenty-five years later that the full implications for power politics were really felt. In 1956, the humiliating fiasco of the Suez crisis combined military incompetence and failure with vulnerability to financial pressure, and marked the end of Britain's claims to be an arbiter of the international order. 1 There is an obvious parallel between Great Britain at the time of Suez and the travails of the United States after the 2003 invasion of Iraq and subsequent confusion at the prospect of a shift of the geography of economic influence and political power. Americans are hearing the echoes of another crisis: the financial and economic disaster of the 1930s that brought about the transition from a world built around the pax Britannica to the so-called pax Americana of the late twentieth century. Seeing how that transition of the midtwentieth century was understood may help us grapple with the challenges of our currently unstable world order. There are two dimensions of the response, one concerned with the economics of the world, the other with economic geo-politics.
I
In the Great Depression, it looked as if existing economic ideas were completely discredited by the severity of the crisis. Today, there are analogies to that 1930s belief in a need for a paradigm change. In the aftermath of the sub-prime crisis and the Lehman collapse the fingers pointed at the United States as an example of how badly things could go wrong. It was now generally supposed that the American model had failed. America's reputation in the new millennium took a double whammy, first with the Iraq invasion, then with the financial crisis. Anyone who dreamt of the American way of life now looked stupid.
Immediately after Lehman collapsed, the German Finance Minister, Peer Steinbrück, put this diagnosis as a challenge not just to the U.S., but to other countries-notably the U.K.-which seemed to have Americanized their financial system.
2 The problem lay in over-reliance on highly complex financial instruments, propagated by globalized American institutions. Steinbrück commented: "The financial crisis is above all an American problem. The other G7 financial ministers in continental Europe share this opinion." 3 Criticism of America did not stop there. His successor Wolfgang Schäuble continued in the same tone, with comments about "clueless" American monetary policy that was designed only to feed the American financial monster. 4 Then came the European crisis, with its roots in lax government finance in some (mostly southern European) countries. Critics now had a new focus. Naturally, many conservative Americans were delighted by the imminent failure of what they saw as a tax and spend society, addicted to a costly and inefficient welfare state. They were not the only critics. The chairman of China Investment Corporation, Jin Liquin, commented skeptically on ideas that China should bailout Europe. It was "a worn-out welfare society" with "outdated" welfare laws that induces sloth and indolence. 5 The international criticism of large European transfer payments may have some justification in that Greek and Italian civil servants did indeed have possibilities of retiring quite young. Restrictive labor laws did indeed make it unattractive for many firms to hire new workers. But the critique only captures one small part of the European difficulty. The fiscal dilemmas of Greece and Spain were also the result of spending a great deal on high technology and high prestige projects, facilities for the Olympic Games, new airport buildings, and high speed train links. 6 Oops. Wasn't that also an increasingly important part of the transformation of China since the 1990s?
7 Chinese citizens are now frustrated not only with increasingly obvious imperfections and inadequacies in the high-speed trains, but also wondering whether their government set the right priorities. Spain and Ireland before the crisis did not have a fiscal problem, because of the dynamic growth produced by a real estate boom that seemed to indicate a new era of economic miracles. 8 Oops again. Is that not a description of how property prices soared in China?
One of the most widely used Chinese terms of recent years is 幸灾乐祸 (xìng zāi lè huò), not easily translated into English but well rendered by the German word Schadenfreude. Somebody else-some other society-has simply tripped on an enormous political banana skin. Asian critics looking at first America and then Europe could easily convince themselves that the conventional platitudes of liberal and democratic politics and economics were collapsing. There are other versions of Schadenfreude too. Vladimir Putin and Christina Kirchner liked to think that their versions of a controlled economy and controlled society built in the aftermath of default on foreign debt offered a more viable alternative to cosmopolitan international capitalism. Both are now facing major problems with disillusioned populations.
5 James, supra note 2. 6 See id. 7 See id. 8 See id.
In short, there exist many more common vulnerabilities in the world's major economies than is commonly supposed. A response to global challenges that is simply based on Schadenfreude may promote a short term sense of wellbeing. In one country or region, people often like to think how lucky they are to have escaped the mess that originated elsewhere. But soon they encounter their own banana skin. Today's global economy is full of the noise of slipping and falling economic models. And tomorrow may be even noisier.
All this erroneous drawing of fallacious conclusions takes us back into the era of the Great Depression, when the prevailing wisdom was that liberal economics (derided as old-fashioned laissez faire)-and also liberal politics had collapsed and that the real future lay with radical doctrines that reshaped politics but also economics: fascism, and its more extreme German variant National Socialism, or Stalin's version of Soviet communism. It is only relatively recently that we have washed away the political eyewash and realized quite how bad the economic performance of the Soviet Union or Nazi German really was in the 1930s-and we still remember how Keynes factors of production, while in a large state it is harder for labor or capital to escape. Large states are thus inclined to control, while correspondingly small states are likely to be quicker in opening up their labor markets, 11 as well as in reducing rates of taxation on capital. They not only do deregulation more effectively; paradoxically they also manage social protection better. Public resources can be used to compensate the losers of the globalization process, and thus to make it acceptable to a broad political audience. This model, pioneered by Scandinavian countries since the 1970s, 12 and especially effectively in the 1990s, has rightly become a widely admired European ideal.
In debates about international order, the small states are-as they were in the interwar world too-the natural constituents of a demand for an overarching supranational international order that might protect their interests but might also represent a general interest.
The late twentieth century shift in advantage to the small state was not a permanent one, and-perhaps since the turn of the millennium-we can see at work again the classic realist logic expounded during the interwar period by the British writer E.H. Carr. 13 Advantages fall to powerful and populous states (China, Russia, the United States) that can dominate or manipulate markets in energy or other scarce commodities. The previous winners, such as Swiss banks or Finnish mobile telephony, look vulnerable because they are not backed by political power. By contrast, big states, like big banks, have come out of the financial crisis looking stronger.
III
The pendulum swing back to a world in which the advantage lies with the strong, who can muster large concentrations of economic and demographic resources, was visible before the 2007 financial crisis. It has become much more evident since then. It has been enunciated, rather brutally in Europe, by Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel, when she laid out the conditions for aid to Greece in the crisis of spring 2010 on May 19. She stated that "the rules must not be oriented toward the weak, but toward the strong. That is a hard message. But it is an economic necessity." 14 On the global scene, we are now becoming obsessed with the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) as new giants. 15 The continuation of the crisis will turn them into Big Really Imperial Countries. The future of globalization is thus one in which power politics rather than markets will drive events. That makes for competition, rather than cooperation, or what Gideon Rachman calls a zero-sum view in a world of anxiety replacing a win-win mindset in an age of optimism. 16 The recent news that China has surpassed Japan as the world's second largest economy in GDP terms thus did not come as a surprise.
17 Japan is a big economy masking as a small state, with all the aversion to the practical exercise of power that characterizes second and third tier states. By contrast, China has always been about greatness. The accelerated push of China to Great Power status is the major geo-political outcome of the Great Recession of the early 14 twenty-first century. That outcome carries economic hope but also political fear.
First the good news about the new role of China: it lies-at least up to now-in the economic side of the case. Alongside better monetary policy and more flexible exchange rates between the big industrial blocs, the response of China along with other big emerging market economies to the world financial crisis is the central explanation why the financial turbulence that emanated from the U.S. subprime crisis did not completely destroy the world economy and lead to a repeat of the 1930s Great Depression.
In the longer term the fallout from China's stimulus may be more mixed. Stabilizing the world economy is not a costless process, as indeed it was not in the second half of the twentieth century for the U.S. The holding of dollar assets, which probably constitute around sixty-six percent of China's current $2.7 trillion reserves, 18 are likely to produce a major book loss for the People's Bank of China. The domestic stimulus package which delivered a massive underpinning of the world economy in the financial crisis, and which also started a rebalancing of the global imbalances, will have problematical repercussions. As well as public subsidies, largely for infrastructure projects, the Chinese stimulus involved a vast expansion of bank loans (some $1.5 trillion), which may become a major problem for China's banks. 19 No less an authority than Prime Minister Wen Jinbao stated:
In case of China, there is a lack of balance, coordination and sustainability in the economic development.
The main problems include the unreasonable economic structure, weak capabilities for scientific and technological innovation, rising resources and environmental constraints, uneven 18 urban-rural and regional development and lack of coordination between economic and social development. 20 In the longer run, China will become obsessed with the challenge posed by an aging population. Thus already at an early point in its rise to preeminence, China is likely to be concerned with the sustainability of its position. 21 
IV
The real challenge for China's leaders will be to develop a coherent view of the world that does not scare its neighbors-and others. The Chinese dilemma today is not unlike the American one of the mid-twentieth century. How can a new superpower maintain and extend its power in a world playing by commercial rules? Its effectiveness as a concentration of power, its sustainability as a state, its ability to satisfy domestic claims all depend on an open world economy. There are high costs if other states try to close themselves off, and openness cannot be achieved simply at gunpoint.
In the 1930s, the United States did not stabilize the world economy, and did not have a vision of the global order. That only evolved in the 1940s and later, and in response to the very fundamental challenges to human liberty and human dignity posed by Hitler and then by Stalin. International relations scholars have emphasized the extent to which international rules can be a way of externalizing domestic preferences, a way of embedding a liberal order or of "tying one's hands" that produces long term benefits for domestic politics in that it defines an arena in which choices can be made. 22 The fact that the political system of the leading country is open and decentralized is bolstered by the international order; and it also acts as a guarantee to other powers that they have a mechanism for advocacy of their own interests. 23 China in the 2000s has contributed to a stabilization of the world economy, but there is absolutely no sign that it is evolving a vision of a new global order that goes beyond xìng zāi lè huò or Schadenfreude, that the conventional platitudes of liberal and democratic politics and economics are collapsing.
The key to whether the coming order is peaceful or not will lie in the ability of Chinese leaders-and in general of those in the big emerging economies-to encompass a vision that can provide an adequate psychological foundation not just for commerce across countries, but also for more profound levels of human exchange.
Globalization is not just about seizing and exploiting market opportunities. In 2009, the Governor of the People's Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan, in a frontal attack on American hegemony emphasized the importance of Confucianism, which values "thrift, self-discipline, zhong yong or Middle Ground (low-key), and antiextravagancy." 24 This sounds like nostalgia for the Weberian conception 25 of a Protestant work ethic, which the West has lost or abandoned.
Such appeals raise again Max Weber's fundamental question of how and why the work ethic is motivated, and in what ways it corresponds to basic human proclivities. 26 We cannot simply understand economic life by observing its operation; we need to think about an inner logic, and about how that logic corresponds with the nature and the development of human character. In that sense, the financial crisis has brought us back to basics. The Chinese leadership understands this, but does not yet know how to respond. It can see the Chinese setting very acutely, but not how that answer can apply in a universe of values that are-well, universal.
